The paper studies the implications for the effectiveness of discretionary monetary policymaking of departing from the assumption of rational expectations. Society, whose welfare function is quadratic, can appoint a central banker whose preferences are either quadratic or lexicographic, to achieve the best mix of inflation and output stability. The focus on lexicographic preferences is justified on the grounds that they imply a strict ordering of policy objectives, which is typical of the mandate of several central banks. Both the private sector and the monetary policymaker have incomplete knowledge of the working of the economy and rely upon adaptive learning to form expectations and decide policy moves. The model economy is assumed to be subject to recurrent unobserved shifts, and the monetary authority, who has private information on the shocks hitting the economy, cannot credibly commit. The main finding of the paper is that when agents rely on an adaptive learning technology, a bias against activist policies arises. The paper also shows that when society has quadratic utility, a strategy based on a strict ordering of objectives is close to optimal for a wide range of values of the inflation aversion parameter.
Introduction
Effective policymaking requires that the monetary authority commit to a systematic approach to policy. As long as price setting depends on expectations of the future, a credible central bank may be able to face an improved short-run trade-off between inflation and output and, accordingly, it may reduce inflation at lower costs. However, for policymakers to succeed in steering expectations and reaping the benefits of commitment, agents must be able to fully anticipate the future impact of monetary decisions on the economy, which is feasible only if the economic environment is stationary and expectations are rational. When, on the contrary, the structure of the economy is subject to recurrent shifts and knowledge is imperfect, agents must rely on alternative methods for anticipating future events, and this may dramatically alter the policy trade-offs.
A recent stream of literature, epitomized by Orphanides and Williams (2002) , has shown that imperfect knowledge makes stabilization policies more difficult. This happens when central banks put too much weight on output stabilization, because overly activist policies are prone to generate episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective. An additional complication arises from the fact that if knowledge is incomplete, committing to a systematic policy becomes problematic (because the private sector cannot easily verify whether the central bank is delivering on its promises) and the gains from commitment are severely reduced (because expectations, being backward rather than forward looking, cannot be manipulated to increase policy effectiveness). This paper focuses on how the relaxation of the rational expectations hypothesis changes the way monetary policy is set. It applies a principal-agent approach to the time-inconsistency problem: in order to improve the discretionary equilibrium, society (the principal) assigns a loss function to the central bank (the agent) that may differ from society's preferences. The assumption underlying this approach is that it is possible to commit the monetary authority to a particular loss function, whereas the minimization of the loss function occurs under discretion. Society has standard quadratic preferences on output and inflation, and the central banker is endowed with either a quadratic or a lexicographic preference ordering. The literature on monetary policy almost always relies on the assumption of quadratic preferences, but such a loss function does not reflect the task assigned to the monetary authority of most developed countries and does not account for the role of factors that are vital in actual policymaking.
1 Lexicographic preferences overcome a few of these shortcomings: they capture a hierarchical ordering of alternatives, which is typical of the mandate of virtually every inflation-targeting central bank, 2 and allow the policymaker to focus on different policy objectives under different circumstances.
The main findings of the paper are the following. First, it is confirmed that when agents do not possess complete knowledge about the structure of the economy and rely on an adaptive learning technology, a bias toward conservatism arises, suggesting that society is better off by appointing a policymaker whose degree of inflation aversion is higher than its own; even if there is no intrinsic dynamics in the economy, agents' and policymakers' attempts to learn adaptively introduce inertia in the system, which makes it costly for the central bank not to respond promptly and forcefully to shocks. Second, what matters for society's welfare is that the degree of inflation aversion of the monetary authority is high enough to prevent expectations from fluctuating too much: the specific form the loss function of the central bank takes is of second-order importance. Third, the bias against stabilization policies and toward conservatism, and the relative efficiency of alternative monetary strategies, do not depend on whether the memory of the learning process is finite or infinite.
The paper is related to the literature in several ways. It parallels, under more general conditions, the work of Terlizzese (1999) and Driffil and Rotondi (2003) in deriving the properties of a monetary strategy that has price stability as its primary objective and does not allow inflation to rise above an upper limit; it models two-sided learning in the vein of Evans and Honkapohja (2002) ; and it uses the study of Orphanides and Williams (2002) as a 1 The following are just a few of these factors: (i) uncertainty (see al-Nowaihi and Stracca 2002); (ii) imperfect observability of the state variables (see Svensson and Woodford 2000) ; and (iii) path dependence and differential valuation of deviations from the inflation and output targets (see Orphanides and Wilcox 1996) .
2 Buiter (2006) presents a list of the central banks whose mandates reflect a lexicographic preference ordering, with price stability ranking first and all other desiderata coming after.
benchmark for the quantitative analysis. The most closely related of these contributions is the work of Orphanides and Williams: model simulations are designed so as to replicate their experiments, and the objective of this paper is to a large extent the same as theirs-namely, to understand how the economy responds to alternative monetary strategies when agents have bounded rationality and imperfect knowledge.
The original contribution of this work is to extend the findings by Orphanides and Williams (2002) . It tries to do that in three different ways. First, it assumes that not only private agents but also the policymaker have imperfect knowledge; under this framework, policy effectiveness ends up depending on both inflation and output variability so that the bias toward conservatism, if confirmed, cannot be attributed to the limited role of output volatility in the reference model. Second, it tests whether society can increase welfare by appointing a policymaker whose preference ordering is lexicographic. Third, it tests the claim about the negative impact of imperfect knowledge on economic stabilization under a set of alternative learning mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model used in the paper and contrasts the implications of assuming quadratic or, alternatively, lexicographic preferences. Section 3 introduces econometric learning and studies how different policies affect the speed at which learning algorithms converge to the rational expectations equilibrium. Section 4 presents some evidence, obtained by means of simulation, on the distortions on monetary policymaking caused by assuming that agents have bounded rationality; the focus is on whether adaptive learning induces a bias toward conservatism and whether appointing a central banker whose preferences are lexicographic is welfare improving. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The model presented in this section has two basic components: (i) the unobservability of the supply shock and (ii) an unknown and time-varying output-inflation trade-off. The model is first solved under rational expectations and then under adaptive learning.
The Structure of the Economy and the Delegation Problem
The economy is characterized by an expectations-augmented Phillips-curve relationship, linking inflation surprises π − π e to the output gap y:
Inflation is the policy instrument and is controlled without error by the monetary authority; the natural level of output is normalized at 0. Output also responds to a zero-mean supply shock ε, unobservable to the central bank and the private sector and uniformly distributed on the closed interval [−µ, µ] . A signal z, conveying noisy information on ε, is observed by the policymaker after expectations have been determined; it is assumed that z = ε + ξ, with ξ following a uniform distribution with the same support as ε, i.e.,
The final component of the model is the assumption that α, the output-inflation trade-off, is a random variable. Since α is time varying, the effects of monetary policy on output depend on the value of the trade-off. It is assumed that α =ᾱ + α ∼ IID(ᾱ, σ 2 α ) and that it is independent of all the other shocks in the economy.
4 Notice that the model is entirely static, so that no issue of strategic interaction between the monetary authority and the private sector arises.
The timing of the model is shown in figure 1 . The signal z materializes before the central bank chooses the inflation rate but after private agents have set their inflation expectations for the period. The information advantage of the central bank creates a role for 3 The assumption that both ε and ξ follow a uniform distribution ensures that in the rational expectations equilibrium a closed-form solution exists. The additional hypothesis that both shocks share the same support helps to keep the distribution of z simple. 4 The stochastic variable α can be interpreted as an index of monetary policy effectiveness. It can be either discrete or continuous. What is relevant is the i.i.d. assumption, which avoids introducing dynamic elements and strategic interactions into the optimization problem of the central bank. Ellison and Valla (2001) show that strategic interactions create a connection between the activism of the central bank and the volatility of inflation expectations: the latter reacts to the former because an activist policy produces more information, helping private agents learn. The value of experimentation in policymaking is also studied in Wieland (2003) . z t π t y t stabilization policies and takes into account the fact that policy decisions can be made more frequently than most wage and price decisions. Society has quadratic utility and dislikes both inflation and output variability. Its welfare function is
where k is the target level of output; the expectation operator is due to the unobservability of the output-inflation trade-off α and output shock ε. The assumption that k > 0 is usually justified on the grounds that the presence of distortions in the labor and goods markets leads to an inefficiently low level of output in equilibrium; alternatively, k > 0 is interpreted as arising from political pressures on the central bank, as in Mishkin and Westelius (2006) . In the principal-agent approach, society, whose preferences are quadratic, can appoint a central banker whose loss function may differ from its own. It is assumed that the choice is restricted to policymakers with either quadratic or lexicographic preferences; in the first case, the inflation aversion parameter β can be different from β S .
Central Bank Loss Function
Though in general a lexicographic-preference ordering cannot be represented by a function, in the simplified case in which the monetary authority has been given only two objectives, such an ordering can be described by a loss function involving only the secondary objective, subject to a constraint involving the primary target. It is therefore assumed that the central bank aims at stabilizing output around a nonzero level, provided that inflation is kept below a known upper bound. 5 Though there is some dispute about the correctness of formulations depicting central bankers as affected by an inflation bias, the assumption is retained because otherwise the only rational expectation for inflation would be the zero target itself and the inflation constraint would never be binding.
In formal terms, the problem solved by the central bank is
Notice that k cannot exceed µ, the upper bound of the output shock: in that which follows, it will be assumed that k is not too high and, in particular, that k = µ 6 . Under the standard hypothesis of time separability of preferences, the problem is static and involves no trade-off between current and future utility, so that the optimal policy does not have to rely on the strategic interactions described by Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) , Ellison and Valla (2001), and Wieland (2003) .
To highlight the implications of endowing the monetary authority with lexicographic preferences, the policy problem is also analyzed under the standard assumption that the loss function is quadratic. In this case, the problem solved by the central bank can be formulated as
where β measures the weight attached to the inflation objective relative to output stabilization. Regardless of the specific form of the loss function, be it (3) or (4), the model features an inflation bias, arising from the policymaker's incentive to create surprise inflation in order to keep output above the natural level. Many economists, however, think that such a feature makes the model irrelevant for monetary policy analysis.
7
Jensen (2003) argues that the Barro-Gordon-type models can be rescued by noting that their main implications-notably, the inflation bias result-can be maintained without having to resort to the presumption that the central bank engenders inflation surprises to fool the public.
Signal Extraction and the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Given the structure of the problem, the issues of estimating the unobserved output shock and setting the optimal inflation rate can be kept separated and solved sequentially. Before deciding the optimal policy, the central bank has to solve a signal extraction problem. The first step is therefore to derive the probability distribution of z = ε + ξ and the conditional mean E(ε|z). In lemma 1 the density function of the signal z is derived, while in proposition 1 the first moment of the distribution of the output shock ε conditional on z is calculated.
Lemma 1. If z = ε + ξ and ε and ξ are independent uniform random variables, with support on the interval [−µ, µ] , then the density function of z is equal to f (z) =
Proof. See Locarno (2006 Given the assumption regulating the flow of information, the central bank sets the inflation rate on the basis of the observed signal and the private-sector inflation expectations. Under lexicographic preferences, it will choose the inflation rate that solves the first-order condition E[α(α(π − π e ) + ε − k) | z] = 0-provided the inflation constraint is satisfied-and will choose π =π otherwise, i.e.,
where
2 . The optimal policy depends, in a nonlinear way, on the value of z: when output shocks are strongly negative and the primary objective is at risk, the central bank acts as an inflation nutter; when the signal indicates more-favorable disturbances, it displays more activism, favoring output stabilization. Notice that the optimal policy depends on the parameters of the distribution of the output-inflation trade-off α. Two cases are considered, one corresponding to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE), and the other assuming bounded rationality and least-squares learning. In the first case, it is assumed that α is not observed but α and σ A few points illustrating the main properties of optimal policy are worth stressing. First, the optimal policy is not altered by the unobservability of the output shock, except that the policymaker responds to an efficient estimate of the state variable rather than to its actual value. It is a well-known fact that a linear model with a quadratic loss function and a partially observable state of the economy is characterized by certainty equivalence; since the assumed preference ordering is not quadratic, the result applies only when inflation is within the admissible range. Second, uncertainty about the multiplier of the policy instrument makes it optimal to react less than completely to the output shock. There is nothing to be gained by adopting more-activist policies in order to learn from experimentation, since the model is static and the loss in current welfare incurred in overreacting will not be compensated by future gains. The reduction in policy activism caused by parameter uncertainty, originally shown by Brainard (1967) , reflects the direct impact of the monetary authority's instrument on the variability of the target variable.
For the equilibrium to be fully characterized, the solution for expected inflation must be provided. Under rational expectations, agents understand the incentives driving the actions of the central bank and have expectations that coincide on average with realizations. Accordingly, π e = πdF (z), where F (z) is the distribution function of the signal z. Proposition 2 gives the full characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium under the simplifying assumption that k = µ 6 .
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Proposition 2. If the central bank has lexicographic preferences and output is determined as in (1), there is a unique REE, where
Proof. See Locarno (2006) .
Equilibrium is noncooperative Nash: the central bank and the private sector try to maximize their respective objective functions, taking as given the other player's actions. The assumption of rational expectations implicitly defines the loss function of the private sector as E(π − π e ) 2 : given the public's understanding of the central bank's decision problem, its choice of π e is the one minimizing disutility.
From the expression for π e , it is apparent that the existence of an upper bound on inflation contributes to stabilizing expected inflation: for any value of k, the lowerπ is, the lower expected inflation is. Another feature of the policy is that the larger the support of the output shock, the closer to zero π e . The reason for this result is straightforward: positive (and higher than k) output shocks trigger a 9 Setting k = µ 6 amounts to assuming that 2k + φ(π e −π) = 0 and implies that the central bank chooses its best static response when z > 0, while it has no discretion for negative values of the signal.
reaction from the central bank, which creates negative inflation surprises to stabilize output; large negative disturbances, on the other hand, cannot be neutralized, because too-high inflation rates are not admissible. Widening the support of ε has an asymmetric effect on the actions of the monetary authority: it increases the cases in which the central bank finds it optimal to deflate, but has no influence on its incentives to inflate.
Two features of the optimal monetary policy are worth stressing. First, for values of the signal in the nonempty interval [−2µ, 0), inflation is constant and equal toπ, which is higher than π e : the central bank keeps price dynamics above inflation expectations and, in so doing, it sustains output, though it cannot cushion it against shocks. Second, even in the face of favorable output shocks, the policymaker is unable to fully stabilize output at the desired level. Two factors contribute to attenuate the policymaker's response: uncertainty about the output-inflation trade-off and unobservability of ε. The former reduces the response of the central bank by a factor of 2α φ , while the latter leaves part of the output shock, namely, ε − z 2 , unchecked. Since z 2 is an unbiased estimate of ε, unobservability of the output shock increases volatility but does not affect the degree of activism of the policy response; on the contrary, unobservability of the output-inflation trade-off has a bearing on the policy strategy, since it favors more cautious policies. It turns out that output volatility is therefore smaller than µ 2 3 , the variance of the output shock, implying some degree of stabilization on the side of monetary policy.
To assess the distinguishing traits of the policy pursued by a central bank with lexicographic preferences, it is useful to contrast it with the optimal policy arising under the standard assumption of quadratic loss function. If (4) describes the central bank's problem, the policy instrument is set according to the rule
where ρ ≡ᾱ
A few differences are apparent when comparing the two optimal policies. When output shocks are not too negative, rule (5) ensures more output stabilization, as the increase in the inflation rate that must be engendered to counteract the supply disturbance does not have a negative impact on welfare and hence does not bring on a trade-off between the output and the inflation objectives. The reverse is true when ε is large and negative, because in that case output stabilization is sacrificed to the primary objective of price stability. More activist policies are possible at the cost of larger inflation variability: in general, there exists a valueβ such that, for β ∈ (β, ∞), output variability under lexicographic preferences (henceforth, strategy 1) is lower than under quadratic utility (henceforth, strategy 2), and there exists a value β such that,
2 is smaller under strategy 1. 10 Since β <β, strategy 1 apparently cannot outperform strategy 2 in terms of both objectives, but in reality this is not necessarily the case, since what is important for social welfare is not
but Eπ 2 . Under strategy 1 the central bank can use an additional instrument-the upper bound on inflationπ-to try to achieve both lower output volatility and lower mean-square inflation: the reason that strategy 1 is more appealing compared with Rogoff's (1985) solution is that the reduction of the inflation bias does not come at the cost of the output-stabilization objective;
11 the reason it is less valuable is that it tends to stabilize output too much when π <π.
Adaptive Learning and Monetary Policy Regimes
In the real world, where shifts in policies and in the economic structure are by no means rare events, people often face the problem of understanding whether and how the environment has changed and which is the least costly way to adapt decision rules to suit the new framework. In such a context, a strict application of the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) would not be a convincing 10 See Locarno (2006) , proposition 4, for a formal proof. 11 This is easily seen by noting that the choice ofπ has no effect on the set of values of z corresponding to inactive policies. This implies that it is always optimal for the policymaker to setπ so that π e is equal to 0.
theoretical solution. Alternatives have long been suggested. Herbert Simon (1957) , for instance, supported some kind of bounded rationality and proposed to create a theory with behavioral foundations where agents learn in the same way as econometricians do. An increasingly important stream of literature, which builds on the pioneering work of Bray (1982) and Marcet and Sargent (1989) , recently revived in particular by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) , has introduced a specific form of bounded rationality, called adaptive learning, where agents adjust their forecast rule as new data becomes available over time. This approach provides an asymptotic justification for the REH and makes nonlearnable solutions in models with multiple equilibria irrelevant. The central idea behind adaptive learning is that at each period t, private agents have a perceived law of motion (PLM) that they use to make forecasts. The PLM relates the variables of interest, whose future values are to be anticipated, to a set of state variables; the projection parameters are estimated using least squares. Forecasts generated in this way are used in decisions for period t, which yields the temporary equilibrium, also called the actual law of motion (ALM). The temporary equilibrium provides a new data point, and agents are then assumed to reestimate the projection parameters with data through period t and to use the updated forecast functions for period t + 1 decisions. The learning dynamics continue with the same steps in subsequent periods.
The updating of the projection coefficients may be represented in terms of a system of recursive equations having, under reasonable assumptions for the PLM, the rational expectations equilibrium as a fixed point. The recursive equations describe the mapping between the PLM and the ALM. Convergence of the adaptive learning process may be studied by means of the associated ordinary differential equation (ODE):
12 stability holds whenever the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the ODE are negative, i.e., whenever the system is E-stable.
The connection between E-stability and the convergence of leastsquares learning is a great advantage, since E-stability conditions are often easier to work out. However, focusing on asymptotic approximations puts aside any consideration of the learning speed. Benveniste, Metiver, and Priouret (1990) show that root-t convergence of the learning process holds when the real part of the largest eigenvalue of the Jacobian of the ODE is less than − 1 2 .
13 When this condition on the eigenvalues is not met, no analytic results on the asymptotic distribution are known, since the importance of initial conditions fails to die out quickly enough. Marcet and Sargent (1992) suggest a numerical procedure to obtain an estimate of the rate of convergence. The starting point is the assumption that there is a δ for which
where θ t is the vector of parameters of the PLM, θ is its asymptotic limit, and F is some nondegenerate, well-defined, mean-zero distribution. Marcet and Sargent show that, for large t, a good approximation of the rate of convergence δ is given by the expression
Given t and l, the expectations can be approximated by simulating a large number of independent realizations of length t and l × t, and calculating the mean square across realizations. In this section, adaptive learning is introduced to analyze the implications of imperfect knowledge on policy outcomes. The question to be answered is how the interaction between learning and central bank preferences affects aggregate welfare. For the sake of clarity, the case where only the private sector learns is considered first; then the model is expanded to incorporate central bank learning.
Private-Sector Learning
Suppose that private agents have nonrational expectations, which they try to correct through adaptive learning. Assume also that the policymaker does not explicitly take agents' learning into account and continues to set policy according to either (5) or (6). The evolution of output and inflation is therefore described by the system
where the inflation rate depends on the monetary authority's preferences.Ê P π represents the current estimate of the inflation rate of the private sector, whileÊ CB π is the value of inflation expectations used in the central bank's control rule. It is assumed that private agents run regressions to setÊ P π, while the monetary authority, which observesÊ P π before moving, has rational expectations and therefore setsÊ CB π =Ê P π. At each period t, private agents have a PLM for inflation, which they use to make forecasts. This PLM takes the formÊ
The estimate a P t is updated over time using least squares; 1 t represents the gain parameter, which is a decreasing function of the sample size. Equation (10), in line with the literature, is in recursive form, uses data up to period t − 1, and requires a starting value at time t = 0. The PLM has the same form as the RE solution for expected inflation: private agents estimate the parameter of the reduced form and setÊ
Consider first the case in which the central bank acts as if it had a lexicographic ordering of preferences. The ALM turns out to be
The mapping between the PLM and the ALM generates the stochastic recursive algorithm
which is approximated by the following ODE,
Notice that the fixed point of the ODE, namely,
, coincides with the unique REE for expected inflation. The theorems on the convergence of stochastic recursive algorithms can be applied so that convergence is governed by the stability of the associated ODE.
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(globally) stable and hence adaptive learning asymptotically converges to the REE. Notice that the size of the eigenvalue of h(a P ) depends on the share of the support of z corresponding to an active policy: in general, root-t convergence does not hold.
Consider now the situation in which the central bank has quadratic preferences. The optimal policy for the monetary authority is to set π t = ρa P t − ρ φ z t + ρ φ 2k. Compared with the RE case, the central bank does not completely offset inflation expectations and the parameter k enters explicitly the control rule: both features disappear asymptotically, provided a P → π e =ᾱ β k. If agents use recursive least squares, then expectations evolve according to the equations
and
(15) Also in this case, the fixed point of the ODE, namely,
(1−ρ)φ 2k =ᾱ β k, coincides with the unique REE and the system is (globally) stable. In fact,
ρ is positive and smaller than 1. Whether root-t convergence holds depends on the size of β: the higher the weight the central bank attaches to the inflation objective, the faster agents learn. The explanation of this result is quite intuitive: the attempt to offset output shocks requires generating inflation surprises-i.e., moving the inflation rate away from expectations-so that every period agents will have to revise their estimate with values of π that may substantially differ from the unconditional mean. A similar result applies interest, they amount to show that the process π, which is a linear function of z, is bounded and stationary and that the function driving the updating of the projection parameter, namely, πt−1 − aPt−1, is bounded and is twice countinuously differentiable (with respect to both πt−1 and aPt−1), with bounded second derivatives. Whether stability holds locally or globally depends on whether the regularity conditions hold on an open set around the equilibrium or for all admissible values of aP . These regularity conditions, in the present case, are clearly met.
to the case of lexicographic preferences: by reducing the support of the signal corresponding to an active policy (i.e., to a policy that aims at avoiding excessive output fluctuations), expectations adjust more quickly to the long-term equilibrium. Notice that for reasonable parameterization of the model, the value of β must be large for
h(a P ) to be less than − 1 2 , meaning that convergence holds only in the case of a highly inflation-averse central bank.
The previous result is interestingly similar to the one in Orphanides and Williams (2002) , who use a dynamic model based on aggregate supply and demand equations. They find that, with imperfect knowledge, the ability of private agents to forecast inflation depends on the monetary policy in place, with forecast errors on average smaller when the central bank responds more aggressively to inflationary pressures. Significantly improved economic performances can be achieved by placing greater emphasis on controlling inflation: indeed, more-aggressive policies reduce the persistence of inflation and facilitate the formation of expectations, which in turn enhances economic stability and mitigates the influence of imperfect knowledge on the economy. The conclusion of the paper turns out to be quite similar to Rogoff's (1985) solution to the central bank's credibility problem under discretion: to improve welfare, the responsibility of the conduct of monetary policy must be delegated to a policymaker who is more inflation averse than society.
Private-Sector and Central Bank Learning
Consider now the case in whichᾱ and σ 2 α (or, alternatively, φ) are not known to the policymaker. The central bank needs to estimate them since both parameters affect the policy rule through the degree of responsiveness to the signal z. As usual, it is assumed that they are gauged by means of least squares and that the estimate is updated every time new realizations of y and π are available. This form of bounded rationality corresponds to the case in which ε is never observed, so thatᾱ and σ 2 α cannot be directly estimated on the basis of past realizations of the output shock.
To account for central bank learning, the previous model must be augmented with a new set of recursive equations, which are the same irrespective of the monetary authority's preferences, as learning involves parameters rather than variables so that the values to be estimated are not related to agents' behavior.
The system of recursive least-squares equations is now the following:
or, more compactly,
where θ t = (a P t ,α t , R y,t , R π,t ) , R y,t−1 = S y,t , R π,t−1 = S π,t , and X t = (1, α t , z t , ε t ) . The first equation is the same as in the previous section and captures private-sector learning, while the others refer to the central bank's inference problem:α t is an estimate of the mean value of the output-inflation trade-off; R y,t measures the sample variance of y − z 2 , the policy-driven component of the output gap;
16 and R π,t is the second moment of the inflation surprise. As shown below, the central bank calculates the statistics R y,t and R π,t as an intermediate step in estimating the optimal response coefficient to the signal z in the policy rule.
While the recursion for R π,t is obvious, as it is simply the estimate of the variance of the inflation surprise, the other two equations require some explanations. To understand the recursion forα t , notice that the output equation can be rearranged as
16 Since E(ε|z) = z 2 , the difference y − z 2
represents (an unbiased estimate of) the share of the output gap that depends on the inflation surprise only.
The central bank observes the signal z and can efficiently estimatē α by regressing y − z 2 on the inflation surprise (π − a P ). Using y − z 2 as the regressand allows for the elimination of the simultaneity bias: the inflation surprise, being a linear function of the signal z only, is uncorrelated with ε − z 2 (the residual of the regression of ε on z) and with α, by assumption orthogonal to all other shocks in the model.
The justification for the recursion for R y,t is somewhat more complicated. A biased estimator of E(α 2 ) can be obtained from the sample average of the squared (policy-driven component of the) output gap, scaled by the second moment of the inflation surprise,
The bias can be easily calculated, since it depends on E(π−a P ) 2 and on known parameters. The sample estimate ofᾱ 2 + σ 2 α is therefore obtained by using the expression ψ t ≡
.
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Whether the stochastic recursive algorithm converges depends on the associated ODE, i.e., on the Jacobian of the matrix h(θ) = lim t→∞ EQ(t, θ, X t ). In the case of lexicographic preferences, it can be shown that the ODE is
17 One alternative could have been to regress (y − z 2
The drawback of this approach is that the bias is a more convoluted function of the model parameters than it is in the case considered in the paper.
while for the standard quadratic case it is equal to ⎡
It is apparent that while the specific form of the loss function does not affect the inference problem of the central bank, it has a bearing on private-sector learning.
Both systems are recursive. R π → E(π − a P ) 2 from any starting point, which implies that R
2 → I, provided R π is invertible along the path. The same happens for R y . Hence, the stability of the differential equation forα may be assessed regardless of the remaining part of the system. Conditional onα, R y , and R π approaching the true parameter values, convergence to the REE of private-sector expectations is determined on the basis of the eigenvalues of the ODE for a P . It is noticeable that the probability limit of the latter does not depend on the information set of the central bank and is the same whether or not the monetary authority knows the full structure of the economy. Conditions for learnability of the REE under both lexicographic and quadratic preferences are stated in the next proposition. (18) Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3. Assume that the economy is endowed with agents that rely on adaptive learning to form expectations; moreover, assume that the central bank has only incomplete information about the structure of the economy and uses recursive least squares (RLS) to estimate the unknown parameters. Then, the asymptotic behavior of the system is described by
As in the case when only the private sector learns, the effect of preferences on the speed of convergence is not clear. For small values of β, a central bank setting policy so as to minimize a quadratic loss function seems to be less effective in driving the economy toward the REE, while the opposite is true when β is high. However, central banks' imperfect knowledge introduces an additional layer of interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes, and model dynamics cannot be properly analyzed by focusing only on asymptotic distributions. In particular, when the learning process is disturbed by several sources of shocks, the ODE becomes an acceptable approximation to the stochastic recursive algorithm only for large values of t, and the asymptotic distribution is not of much help in understanding the properties of the system. The problem is even more serious in models where there are multiple equilibria, since in such cases, in early time periods, when estimates are based on very few degrees of freedom, large shocks can displace θ t outside the domain of attraction of the ODE, and the system can therefore converge to any of the equilibrium points.
18 It follows then that when the agents' information set is severely constrained, both the asymptotic and the finite sample behavior of the system are relevant. Theoretical results are therefore no longer sufficient and it becomes necessary to rely on simulation experiments and numerical results.
Imperfect Knowledge and Policy Effectiveness
Model simulations are used to illustrate how learning affects the dynamic properties of inflation, inflation expectations, and output. First the performance of the forecasting rules is assessed; then the issue of the relative speed of convergence is considered; finally, the output-inflation variability trade-off under alternative monetary regimes is assessed. To account for the finding by Orphanides and 18 When there is a unique equilibrium and the ODE is stable, it can be shown that θt → θ * with probability 1 from any starting point. When there are multiple equilibria, however, such a strong result does not apply, unless one artificially constrains θt to an appropriate neighborhood of the locally stable equilibrium θ * . In the earlier literature, local convergence was obtained by making an additional assumption about the algorithm, known as the projection facility. As a reference, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, section 6.4 Williams (2002)-that policies that put too much weight on output stabilization can generate episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective-additional simulations are run mimicking the impact of a string of negative supply shocks on the economy. Finally, as a further check on how much the results depend on the chosen learning mechanism, the assumption of infinite memory is dropped and the case of perpetual learning is considered.
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Each experiment is based on 500 replications, and all simulations cover an interval of 2,000 periods. Subsamples of 500 observations are also considered in order to estimate the convergence speed. Initial conditions for the lagged variables in the RLS algorithm are randomly drawn from the distribution corresponding to the REE. Results reported in the tables are calculated excluding the first 150 periods so as to minimize the impact of initial observations, which could be too far away from the equilibrium solution. The model is calibrated according to the estimates in Ellison and Valla (2001) ; the selected parameter values are reported in table 1. Concerning β, the relative weight in the loss function of the inflation objective, three values are considered-namely, β = {.176, 1, 5.667}. Under lexicographic preferences, it is assumed thatπ is chosen so as to drive inflation expectations to 0. Tables 2 and 3 report the simulation results: the first table describes the "plain" RLS learning rule (unconstrained estimation, or UE), while the second shows results for the case of constrained The table reports the estimated value (in 500 replications) of expected inflation, the coefficient of the optimal policy rule, the standard deviation of output and inflation, the performance index, and the rate at which estimates of αp,α, and ψ converge to the REE. The performance index is the ratio between the social loss function under the delegated policymaker and that which would have been obtained by appointing a central banker with the same preferences as society's. Agents are assumed to have infinite memory, implying a decreasing-gain sequence. Recursive least-squares estimates are unconstrained (UE case). In columns 1 and 3, the RE values for lexicographic and, respectively, quadratic preferences are shown; in columns 2 and 4, the same statistics are presented for the case when agents learn.
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T = 2,000 RE T = 2,000 The table reports the estimated value (in 500 replications) of expected inflation, the coefficient of the optimal policy rule, the standard deviation of output and inflation, the performance index, and the rate at which estimates of α p ,α, and ψ converge to the REE. The performance index is the ratio between the social loss function under the delegated policymaker and that which would have been obtained by appointing a central banker with the same preferences as society's. Agents are assumed to have infinite memory, implying a decreasing-gain sequence. Recursive least-squares estimates are constrained to belong to a subset of the parameter space (CE case). In columns 1 and 3, the RE values for lexicographic and, respectively, quadratic preferences are shown; in columns 2 and 4, the same statistics are presented for the case when agents learn.
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RE
T = 2,000 RE T = 2,000 20 though they cannot guarantee almost-sure convergence of the learning algorithm, they can in principle contribute to reducing the number of nonconvergent replications.
Expected inflation, the estimate of the policy rule coefficient, the standard deviation of output and inflation, and the performance index are reported in the tables, as is the convergence speed for a P , α t , and ψ t . The performance index is defined as
, depending on which strategy is evaluated. Ey 2 LEX is the second moment of output under strategy 1, and the other terms have a similar meaning; β is in general different from β S , though the case β = β S is also considered. The index is equal to the ratio between the social loss function under the delegated policymaker and the loss that would be obtained by appointing a central banker with the same preferences as society's: when P I < 1, it is efficient to delegate to a policymaker with a utility function that is different from society's. For ease of comparison, the values of the performance index are also shown for the REE.
Regardless of the central bank type, the estimates of expected inflation are precise but biased downward: the higher the values of 20 Convergence of the learning process to the REE holds almost surely when there is a unique solution and the ODE is globally stable; in general, convergence with probability 1 is not guaranteed, since the ODE is not a reliable approximation of the stochastic recursive algorithm for small values of t. Almost-sure convergence holds only when the algorithm is supplemented with a projection facility, i.e., when θt is artificially constrained to remain in an appropriate neighborhood of θ (see section 6.4 and corollary 6.8 in Evans and Honkapohja 2001) . The hypothesis of a projection facility, however, is often criticized because it cannot be easily justified on economic grounds and it is clearly inappropriate for decentralized markets. β, the higher the accuracy of the estimate of a p . Imposing constraints on the support ofᾱ andᾱ 2 + σ 2 α reduces the size of the bias in the case of lexicographic preferences but increases it if the policymaker has quadratic utility. One of the most striking findings of the simulation experiment concerns the minor effect on output and inflation variability of assuming imperfect central bank knowledge: the increase in output and inflation volatility, compared with the REE case, is surprisingly small-in most cases limited to a few percentage points. This is remarkable, since the estimation problem faced by the monetary authority is quite convoluted, requiring dealing with nonlinearities and computing higher-order moments. In the vast majority of cases, the increase in volatility of output and inflation remains well below 10 percent regardless of the preferences of the central bank, suggesting that the cost for the policymaker of having partial knowledge of the working of the economy is not disproportionately large. It is worth remembering, however, that the model lacks intrinsic dynamics, which explains why deviations from the REE tend to be short lived.
The analysis of the performance index provides a few interesting insights to the relative efficiency of the two strategies. The first finding is that, with decreasing gain, learning strategy 1 performs well regardless of the exact value of β S : in the UE case, it is at least as good as strategy 2 unless the degree of inflation aversion is extremely high; in the CE case, it is uniformly better. The second finding is that the shorter the memory of the learning process, the poorer the performance of strategy 1, possibly because of the nonlinearity of the policy rule: when the policymaker has no discretion, the inflation surprises are not informative about the output-inflation trade-off and the recursive estimates become less accurate-in particular, when the size of the sample is small. The third finding is that the relative ranking of the two strategies is the same regardless of the way expectations are formed, which suggests that the learning process converges quite quickly to the REE. A closer inspection of the simulation evidence shows that for low values of β, a central bank endowed with lexicographic preferences is more effective in keeping inflation expectations under control, and it is also successful in stabilizing output fluctuations, even when bounds are not imposed on the RLS algorithm. The situation is reversed when β is high. A downward bias is evident in the estimate of the parameter measuring the response to the signal z, but it mostly disappears in the CE case; the imprecision in guessing the value of 1 φ is responsible for some undesired fluctuations in output, while the excessive volatility of inflation is not attributable to the surprise component but rather to movements in private-sector inflation expectations, which under adaptive learning are not constant as in the REE. Since the bounds imposed on the RLS algorithm mimic the working of a projection facility, the rejection rate in the CE case turns out to be substantially lower.
21 Indeed, because of the complexity of the filtering problem facing the monetary authority, in a large number of replications, shocks displace the recursive algorithm outside of the domain of attraction of the ODE, and the estimate of the optimal response coefficient in the policy rule remains far off the true value. If the estimate of φ is very large at time t, the monetary authority has no incentive to respond aggressively to the signal z, and changes in y mostly reflect output shocks ε: the data become uninformative about the output-inflation trade-off and the estimate of φ gets larger and larger. Expectations become self-fulfilling and the economy gets stuck indefinitely on a suboptimal path, characterized by too passive a monetary policy, as if the policymaker's degree of inflation aversion were enormously higher than society's.
Except for high βs, strategy 2 underperforms strategy 1. It is, however, more effective in enhancing agents' learning process, as witnessed by the more precise estimate of the coefficient of the policy rule, which guarantees that the equilibrium under imperfect 21 The rejection rate is calculated on the basis of the RLS estimate of the second moment of the output-inflation trade-off. Replications are considered diverging if the estimate ofᾱ 2 + σ 2 α is at least three times as large as the true value. The initial 150 observations are not used in the calculation. In the case of lexicographic preferences, absent constraints, the rejection rate turns out to be quite high (some 20 percent); it falls by a factor of 4 if the RLS algorithm is augmented with lower bounds. In the case of quadratic preferences, the number of diverging replications is on average much smaller and so is the gain obtained by imposing constraints on the learning process; for high βs, however, the rejection rate gets larger and becomes similar to the one observed under lexicographic preferences. The estimated number of diverging replications decreases sizably if less-restrictive criteria are used. Notice that divergence pertains to central bank learning and is defined in terms of the estimates of the policy parameters , which become very close to 0: neither the output gap nor the inflation rate are actually deviating boundlessly from equilibrium. knowledge matches very closely the REE. There is no clear evidence that too-low or too-high inflation aversion can have a negative impact on the accuracy of the estimate of ρ φ . Concerning the speed of convergence, the two rules are more or less equivalent, though under CE, strategy 1 seems to be preferable; δ is very close to one half, so that convergence to a Gaussian distribution of both sequences {θ t } LEX and {θ t } QUA cannot be ruled out. As expected, strategy 2 reduces output variability more than strategy 1 when β is low, while the opposite result holds when inflation aversion is very high. The simulation results confirm that when learning substitutes rational expectations, a bias against activist policies arises. Hawkish policies are welfare enhancing because they offset the negative impact of two distortions: (i) the policymaker's desire to push output above the natural level and (ii) the uncoupling of expectations from policy objectives. While the latter distortion is present in the paper by Orphanides and Williams (2002) , the former is not.
Tables 4 and 5 present evidence for the case of perpetual learning; the statistic for the speed of convergence is of course not shown since, under constant-gain learning, θ t may at most converge to a probability distribution but not to a nonstochastic point. No meaningful differences are apparent compared with the previous case. Given the structure of the model, there is no benefit in discarding observations, so it is no surprise that in most cases RLS estimates are less accurate and policies are less successful in stabilizing both output and inflation; the deterioration in policy effectiveness seems to be relatively stronger for strategy 1.
The previous evidence suggests that a benevolent government may be better off appointing a central banker whose preferences are lexicographic if the degree of inflation aversion is not known with certainty or if it changes over time, since strategy 1 can get very close to maximize welfare for a large set of values of β S . Strategy 1 can be implemented by giving the central bank a mandate that specifies an upper (and possibly a lower) bound on inflation and does not require that the government finds the perfect policymaker with the right preferences.
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22 This feature also belongs to inflation-zone targeting; see Mishkin and Westelius (2006) . It is easily seen that when the cost of overshooting (undershooting) the upper (lower) bound gets extremely large (C −→ ∞ in Table 4 . Least-Squares Learning and the Volatility of Output and Inflation (Unconstrained Estimator-Constant-Gain Sequence)
The table reports the estimated value (in 500 replications) of expected inflation, the coefficient of the optimal policy rule, the standard deviation of output and inflation, and the performance index. The performance index is the ratio between the social loss function under the delegated policymaker and that which would have been obtained by appointing a central banker with the same preferences as society's. Agents are assumed to use a finite number of observations in computing RLS estimates, implying a constant-gain sequence. Recursive least-squares estimates are unconstrained (UE case). In columns 1 and 3, the RE values for lexicographic and, respectively, quadratic preferences are shown; in columns 2 and 4, the same statistics are presented for the case when agents learn.
Lexicographic Preferences Quadratic Preferences
RE
T = 2,000 RE T = 2,000 Mishkin's and Westelius's notation) and the policymaker does not care much about inflation variability inside the range (ωπ −→ 0), strategy 1 and inflationzone targeting become more and more alike. The table reports the estimated value (in 500 replications) of expected inflation, the coefficient of the optimal policy rule, the standard deviation of output and inflation, and the performance index. The performance index is the ratio between the social loss function under the delegated policymaker and that which would have been obtained by appointing a central banker with the same preferences as society's. Agents are assumed to use a finite number of observations in computing RLS estimates, implying a constant-gain sequence. Recursive least-squares estimates are constrained to belong to a subset of the parameter space (CE case). In columns 1 and 3, the RE values for lexicographic and, respectively, quadratic preferences are shown; in columns 2 and 4, the same statistics are presented for the case when agents learn.
Lexicographic Preferences Quadratic Preferences
RE
T = 2,000 RE T = 2,000 An additional set of simulations have been run to analyze the dynamic response of output and inflation to a sequence of unanticipated shocks. The experiment is designed supposing that the economy is perturbed by a string of negative output shocks, declining gradually in magnitude and vanishing after twelve periods. With rational expectations, the impact of the shocks is short lived and causes only a temporary fall in output and a rise in inflation, while under imperfect knowledge the response of the economy is prolonged and amplified by agents' learning. The objective of the experiment is to test whether the evidence reported by Orphanides and Williams (2002) -namely, that activist policies end up causing the perceived process for inflation to become uncoupled from the policymaker's objectives-is a general one and extends also to the theoretical framework adopted in this paper.
Tables 6 and 7 report the outcome of the experiment. Regardless of the central bank preferences, activist policies do not seem to pay off: the lower β is, the more volatile inflation and output are, especially the latter. Simulation evidence supports Rogoff's (1985) claim that it is welfare improving to appoint a central banker who places greater relative importance on the inflation objective than society does. No policy seems to be able to offset effectively the impact on activity of a sequence of negative output shocks: it still pays to be hawkish, but the attempts to reduce inflation volatility translate into output fluctuations that are much wider than under rational expectations. What worsens the performance of monetary policy is the uncoupling between expectations and policy targets: since expectations depend upon past values of inflation, they cannot be easily anchored unless the policymaker behaves as an inflation nutter. According to the performance index, strategy 1 is highly successful in promoting social welfare: in the UE case, except for very high values of β, it is more effective than strategy 2; in the CE case, it is uniformly better. A central banker endowed with lexicographic preferences ensures both robustness and effectiveness of monetary policy.
Conclusions
This paper focuses on the implications for the effectiveness of monetary policymaking of departing from the benchmark of rational expectations and applies a principal-agent approach to deal with the time-inconsistency problem that arises when the central bank cannot commit. It is assumed that society can delegate monetary policy to a central banker endowed with either quadratic or lexicographic preferences. Special attention is paid to the latter, which seems to describe more accurately the objectives of inflation-targeting central The table reports a few statistics measuring how the equilibrium outcome under learning differs from the perfect knowledge-i.e., rational expectations-benchmark. Results are presented for both the "plain" RLS algorithm (UE) and the constrained version (CE); agents are assumed to have infinite memory, implying a decreasing-gain sequence. The first two columns refer to lexicographic preferences, while the next two refer to quadratic (dis)utility. To describe the dynamic response of output and inflation and to compare the outcomes under adaptive learning and rational expectations, three measures are computed:
(1) the ratio of the volatility of the target variables under adaptive learning and under rational expectations, (2) the trough, and (3) the peak of the responses of output and inflation. In the last three lines of each section of the The table reports a few statistics measuring how the equilibrium outcome under learning differs from the perfect knowledge-i.e., rational expectations-benchmark. Results are presented for both the "plain" RLS algorithm (UE) and the constrained version (CE); agents are assumed to use a finite number of observations in computing RLS estimates, implying a constant-gain sequence. The first two columns refer to lexicographic preferences, while the next two refer to quadratic (dis)utility. To describe the dynamic response of output and inflation and to compare the outcomes under adaptive learning and rational expectations, three measures are computed: (1) the ratio of the volatility of the target variables under adaptive learning and under rational expectations, (2) the trough, and (3) the peak of the responses of output and inflation. In the last three lines of each section of the banks. The main focus of the paper is on validating the claim that policies that are designed to be efficient under rational expectations can perform very poorly when knowledge is incomplete and agents learn adaptively. The evidence shown in the paper confirms that, when agents do not possess complete knowledge of the structure of the economy and rely instead on an adaptive learning technology, a bias toward conservatism arises, suggesting that society is better off by appointing a policymaker whose degree of inflation aversion is higher than its own. The rationale for this finding is that agents' and policymakers' attempts to learn adaptively introduce inertia into the system and induce prolonged deviations of output and inflation from target, thereby raising the costs for the central bank of not responding promptly and forcefully to shocks. The paper also shows that the strategy that implements a lexicographic-preference ordering performs, on average, very well: it comes close to maximizing social welfare for a wide range of values of β S and outperforms the strategies implementing quadratic preferences unless society is extremely inflation averse.
The findings of the paper closely resemble those of Orphanides and Williams (2002) , which is surprising given the differences in the theoretical framework. First, the model adopted in this paper has no intrinsic dynamics, and the only source of persistence comes from the assumption that agents learn adaptively: the uncoupling between actual and perceived inflation is much harder to achieve with such a simple dynamic structure, though presumably, the lack of dynamics in the economy is compensated by the inertia induced by the attempts of the central bank to estimate the mean and variance of the output-inflation trade-off. Second, though only inflation expectations have a direct impact on the equilibrium outcome, output gap uncertainty affects the central bank's estimates of the moments of α and hence the policy setting: it is by no means obvious that a strategy that penalizes output variability might be conducive to higher welfare. The justification for the existence of a bias in favor of hawkish policies is to be found in the role of central bank learning: too-activist policies reduce the information content of the output gap and make estimates of the coefficients of the policy rule too volatile and unreliable.
the eigenvalue of the Jacobian of the corresponding differential equation has a negative real part. Conditional onα t →ᾱ, convergence of private-sector inflation forecasts follows, since the associated ODE is stable.
A more formal proof of the convergence of the learning process to the REE requires proving that the Jacobian of the ODE, evaluated at the REE θ * , has eigenvalues whose real parts are negative. In order to show that this is indeed the case, first notice that R π = E(π−a P ) 2 at θ * , which implies that R π does not appear in the first three equations of the ODE evaluated at θ * . A similar result holds for R y . In the last two equations, the derivatives of R π and R y (and, accordingly, of E(π − a P )
2 and E(y − z 2 ) 2 ), though different from zero, cancel out, so that the Jacobian has the following upper-triangular, block-recursive structure: It is easily checked that its eigenvalues are (− 1 2 , −1, −1, −1). They are all negative, and the system is therefore E-stable.
Consider now the case of quadratic preferences. The unique equilibrium point θ * of the system (16) is now a P =ᾱ β k,α = α, R π = E(π − a P ) 2 = 2( . The stochastic process X t is the same as in the previous case, so that regularity conditions (B.1) and (B.2) in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) are satisfied. The same holds for the assumptions (A.1)-(A.3) on the gain sequence and the updating function Q(t, θ t−1 , X t ). The stability of the associated ODE (19) can be proved in the same way as for the system (18): provided that R π and R y are invertible along the convergence path, R π → E(π − a P ) 2 from any starting point; central bank estimates converge to the true parameter valuesᾱ, since the eigenvalue of the Jacobian of the corresponding differential equation has a negative real part, and a P →ᾱ β k, since the associated ODE is stable.
As in the previous case, the structure of the Jacobian justifies the sequential solution of the system. At θ * , the derivative matrix of the ODE (19) is equal to The lower block for R π and R y can be solved first; then, triangularity of the upper block ensures that convergence forα t does not depend on the asymptotic behavior of a P t . The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are (− β α 2 +σ 2
